Material Composition by Cornell, David Michael
Article
Material Composition
Cornell, David Michael
Available at http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/26064/
Cornell, David Michael (2018) Material Composition. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy  
. ISSN 2161-0002  
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the work.
For more information about UCLan’s research in this area go to 
http://www.uclan.ac.uk/researchgroups/ and search for <name of research Group>.
For information about Research generally at UCLan please go to 
http://www.uclan.ac.uk/research/ 
All outputs in CLoK are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, including
Copyright law.  Copyright, IPR and Moral Rights for the works on this site are retained 
by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Terms and conditions for use 
of this material are defined in the http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/policies/
CLoK
Central Lancashire online Knowledge
www.clok.uclan.ac.uk
Material Composition
*
 
David M. Cornell 
 
A material composite object is an object composed of two or more material parts. The world, 
it seems, is simply awash with such things. The Eiffel Tower, for instance, is composed of 
iron girders, nuts and bolts, and so on. You and I, as human beings, are composed of flesh 
and bone, and various organs. Moreover, these parts themselves are composed of further 
parts, such as molecules, which themselves are composed of atoms, which are composed of 
sub-atomic particles. Material composite objects are, it seems, ubiquitous. However, despite 
their ubiquity, a little philosophical reflection on the matter, as is so often the case, reveals 
that they are also deeply puzzling.  
The question which has received most attention from philosophers interested in material 
composition is: under what circumstances do two or more material objects compose a 
further object? Why is it, for instance, that a collection of iron girders that are bolted together 
in the centre of Paris do compose an object (i.e. the Eiffel Tower), but that there is no object 
composed of the Eiffel Tower and the Moon? What conditions are satisfied by the first set of 
objects, and not by the second set of objects, which make this the case? In short, what are the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for composition to occur? 
Over the last thirty years or so, philosophers have devoted a lot of attention to this question, 
and it has proved much more difficult to answer than one may have initially thought. This 
entry will provide a survey of the various answers that have been given to this question, and 
the arguments that have been offered in their defence.  
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1. Some Important Preliminaries 
1.1 Mereological Technicalities 
The topic of material composition falls under the wider purview of mereology, which is 
simply the study of parts and wholes. Much of the focus of mereology over the last hundred 
years or so has been on producing a formal theory of part-whole relations, that is, a formal 
theory of the logical relations that hold between parts and the wholes they compose 
(examples include Lesniewski, 1916; Leonard & Goodman, 1940; Simons, 1987). The current 
entry will overlook much of the formal side of the study of mereology, and will instead 
concentrate on some of the key metaphysical questions concerning the nature of material 
composite objects, such as whether there are any such things, and what criteria some things 
need to satisfy in order to compose a composite object. However, it will be useful in the first 
instance to define a few of the key technical terms and expressions that are peculiar to the 
field of mereology: 
 
 Part: 
The term ‘part’ has a slightly different meaning in mereology to that which it has in 
ordinary language. In ordinary language, we use the term part to mean a portion or 
subsection of an object, e.g. the Earth is part of the Solar System, the tail is part of the 
cat, etc. In mereology, however, the term is used such that not only are an object’s 
subsections its parts (e.g. the tail is part of the cat), but objects are also taken to be 
parts of themselves (e.g. the cat is part of the cat). So if you were tasked with writing 
an exhaustive list of all the cat’s parts, on this understanding of the term, you should 
include the cat itself on the list.   
 
 Proper Part: 
Philosophers have taken to distinguishing parts from what are called ‘proper parts’. 
‘Proper part’ is the mereological term that would best tally up with our ordinary or 
common sense use of the term ‘part’, in that an object’s proper parts exclude the 
object itself. Thus if you were tasked with writing an exhaustive list of all the cat’s 
proper parts, the cat itself should not be included on the list.  
 
 Plurally Referring Expressions:  
Following Peter van Inwagen (van Inwagen, 1990), it has become common to use the 
plurally referring expression, ‘the xs’, to refer to some plurality of material objects. 
This enables one to refer to a number of objects at a time in a neutral manner, 
without supposing that those objects do (or don’t) compose a further object. 
 
 Composition: 
Some xs compose a further object, y =df the xs are all parts of y, none of the xs overlap, 
and every part of y overlaps at least one of the xs.  
 
(The qualifications about ‘overlap’ in the above definition can make it sound a bit 
more complicated than it really is. They merely stipulate that one should not list 
overlapping parts of an object when listing the parts that compose it. For instance, 
suppose a necklace were made entirely of pearls. In that case, it would be correct to 
say that the pearls compose the necklace. But, given that the pearls themselves are 
made of atoms, it would also be correct to say that the atoms compose the necklace. 
However, it would be wrong to say that the pearls and the atoms compose the 
necklace, since the pearls overlap the atoms).  
 
 Fusion:  
y is a fusion of the xs =df the xs compose y  
(Note: the term ‘sum’ is sometimes used instead of ‘fusion’).  
 
 Simple: 
x is simple =df  x has no proper parts 
(Note: ‘simple’ is sometimes used as a noun, as well as an adjective, thus one might 
speak of, ‘a simple’, or ‘the simples’).  
 
These are just a few of the many technical terms involved in formal mereology, and they are 
defined here quite informally, for ease of understanding. For those interested in formal 
mereology, Peter Simons’ 1987 book, Parts: a Study in Ontology, provides an excellent place 
to start.  
 
1.2 Composition and Constitution 
The debate over material composition should be distinguished from a related debate 
concerning material constitution. Material composition concerns the question of when two or 
more objects compose a further, composite object. (For instance, if you attach four wooden 
legs to a flat wooden surface, do those five objects now compose a new object: a table?) 
Those interested in material constitution, by contrast, are interested in the question of when 
one object (e.g. a lump of bronze) constitutes another object (e.g. a statue of Napoleon), and 
indeed, what the relation of constitution actually consists in. Material constitution presents 
some real puzzles of its own. For instance, is the lump of bronze a distinct object from the 
statue of napoleon, or are they numerically identical? If we adopt the latter view, that is, that 
there is just a single object there, but one that can be called by different names (i.e. ‘lump of 
bronze’ or ‘statue of Napoleon’), we seem to run into trouble. The trouble emerges when 
you consider what happens if you were to melt down the statue and form it into a shapeless 
lump. The lump of bronze, it seems, would still exist; but the statue would clearly not. By 
melting it down, you destroy the statue, but you do not destroy the lump. This might 
suggest, therefore, that the lump and the statue were not identical after all. Perhaps, then, 
we should adopt the former view, and say that the statue and the lump are not identical, but 
in fact, distinct objects. The problem with this, however, is that it now looks as though, 
before the melting down occurred, we had two distinct objects occupying exactly the same 
space at exactly the same time, which, one could plausibly argue, is impossible. This is the 
central problem of material constitution, and it has generated a considerable literature (see 
Rea, 1997).  
Whilst the debate over material constitution is certainly a puzzling one, it is quite distinct 
from the debate over material composition. However, the two are related in certain ways, 
and there are times at which adopting a view on one debate might well have an impact on 
one’s view concerning the other. The differences, and similarities, between these two distinct 
debates, and how they inter-relate, will become clearer as the entry progresses. 
 
2. The Special Composition Question 
Questions concerning material composition have a long history in philosophy, but they have 
attracted increased attention over recent years thanks largely to the work of Peter van 
Inwagen. In a 1987 article, and at greater length in his 1990 book, Material Beings, van 
Inwagen posed what he called the Special Composition Question (SCQ from hereon). (It is only 
fair to note here that van Inwagen actually credits Hestevold, 1981, with originally 
formulating the SCQ, but it is van Inwagen who made it well-known). This question can be 
phrased as follows:  
(SCQ): Under what conditions do two or more material objects compose a further, composite 
object?  
In other words: what is required in order for some objects to be parts of another object? Or 
as van Inwagen has put it, if you had two objects, what would you need to do to them in 
order to get them to compose something?  
It is perhaps worth noting here that van Inwagen called this the ‘Special’ Composition 
Question, in order to differentiate it from what he called the ‘General Composition 
Question’ (GCQ). The GCQ asks the broader question of what the composition relation 
actually is, in general. Van Inwagen was sceptical about the prospects of answering this 
question, stating he didn’t even know how to approach it, let alone answer it. It seems that 
most philosophers have followed suit, as there is not a great deal of literature on the GCQ. 
(However, see Hawley 2006 for an attempt to shed some more light on the matter).  
 
2.1 Answering the Special Composition Question 
A satisfactory answer to this question should take something like the following form:  
(ANSWER): for any xs (where those xs are material objects) there is a further material object, 
y, composed of those xs if and only if _______________________________________. 
The task, therefore, is to fill in the right-hand side of the above biconditional. But as van 
Inwagen went on to show, this is no easy task. In particular, it seems very difficult to 
provide a principled and systematic answer to the SCQ that accommodates our common 
sense intuitions about when composition does and does not occur. In the end, he concluded 
that it is impossible to provide such an answer. Instead, his own answer is radically counter-
intuitive. Van Inwagen’s answer to the SCQ, which has come to be known as ‘organicism’, 
is: 
 
(ORGANICISM): for any xs (where those xs are material objects) there is a further material 
object, y, composed of those xs if and only if the collective activity of those xs constitutes a 
life.  
 
The reason that this answer is so counter-intuitive is that if it is true, it means that the only 
composite objects in existence are living beings. Inanimate composite objects, according to 
this view, do not exist. There are no cars or buildings, tables or chairs, planets or stars, etc. 
Van Inwagen recognises just how radical this view is – indeed, he calls it “the denial” – but 
he insists that a thorough analysis of the SCQ leads inexorably and inevitably to it. Van 
Inwagen’s own answer to the SCQ has not proved to be all that popular. However, the SCQ 
itself has generated huge amounts of subsequent interest and swathes of further literature.  
It is important to note that any proposed answer to the SCQ will fall into one of the three 
following categories: 
 
1. Compositional Universalism: 
Whenever you have two or more material objects, there is always a further object that 
they compose.  
 
2. Compositional Nihilism: 
No objects compose, and no objects have parts. I.e. there are no composite objects in 
existence.  
 
3. Compositional Restrictivism: 
Some collections of material objects compose further objects, but others do not.  
 
Each of these approaches to the SCQ comes with its own merits and demerits, and each has 
been defended (and attacked) in the contemporary literature. Van Inwagen’s own answer 
falls into the third category, as it says composition occurs sometimes, but only sometimes 
(specifically, when some xs partake in collective activity which constitutes a life). What 
follows will survey some of the central arguments that have been given for and against each 
of these three positions.  
 
3. Compositional Restrictivism 
There is one very compelling reason to think that some variety of compositional 
restrictivism must be true: common sense. On first inspection, it seems simply obvious that 
composition is restricted, i.e. it occurs sometimes, but not all the time. After all, one does not 
need to engage in much serious reflection to realise that the Eiffel Tower, for instance, is 
composed of iron girders, and that the Great Pyramid of Giza is composed of limestone 
blocks. Yet equally obvious is the fact that there is no object which these two great edifices 
together compose (i.e. there is no object which has just the Eiffel Tower and the Great 
Pyramid of Giza as parts). So, since it is plainly evident that there are some cases in which 
objects do compose and other cases in which they do not, it also seems plainly evident that 
composition must be restricted.  
The challenge for the restrictivist, however, is to formulate an answer to the SCQ that 
accommodates these common sense intuitions. That is to say, she must specify the necessary 
and sufficient conditions under which composition occurs, such that they are satisfied by the 
iron girders in Paris (which compose the Eiffel Tower), and the limestone blocks in Giza 
(which compose a pyramid), but not satisfied by the girders and blocks taken together (so 
that we don’t end up with some rather unusual composite pyramid-tower, or such like). The 
literature that has emerged on this topic shows that providing such an answer is no easy 
task.  
 
3.1 Simple Bonding Answers 
In Material Beings, Peter van Inwagen tried to formulate an answer to the SCQ that preserves 
some of our common sense intuitions about composition. He noted that these intuitions very 
often seem to be based on certain facts about how objects are grouped or connected together. 
That is, we often seem to think that objects compose a further object if they are bonded 
together in some appropriate way. The reason that the iron girders in Paris compose a tower, 
for instance, is that they are fastened together with many millions of bolts and rivets and 
what have you, to form a solid and rigid structure. Moreover, the reason that the Eiffel 
Tower and the Great Pyramid of Giza do not compose a material object is precisely because 
they lack any such bonding or unity; they are completely distinct and disconnected objects 
separated by well over a thousand miles. Perhaps, then, bonding could be the secret to 
unlocking the SCQ?  
Van Inwagen labelled his first attempt at a bonding-style answer to the SCQ, CONTACT. 
Very simply, it states that objects need to be physically touching one another if they are to 
compose a further object.  
 
(CONTACT): for any xs (where those xs are material objects), there is a further material 
object, y, composed of those xs if and only if the xs are in contact with one another.  
 
Whilst this answer certainly does give us the intuitive result that the collection of iron 
girders in Paris do compose a tower, and the limestone blocks in Giza do compose a pyramid, 
it also entails certain conclusions which simply fly in the face of common sense. As van 
Inwagen notes, if CONTACT were true, it would mean that every time you shook someone’s 
hand, a new material object would instantaneously pop into existence, only to vanish back 
into nothingness once the handshake ceased. The sheer absurdity of this consequence seems 
to suggest that CONTACT cannot possibly be the correct answer to the SCQ, particularly 
when you remember that what originally motivated it was a desire to preserve common 
sense. 
Van Inwagen went on to consider a number of other bonding-style answers to the SCQ, 
which he called FASTENING, COHESION, and FUSION. Each of these solutions involves a 
greater strength of bond than the last, culminating in FUSION, whereby for objects to 
compose they must be fused together, which means they must be “melt[ed] into each other in 
a way that leaves no discernible boundary” (Van Inwagen, 1990, 59).  
In light of the above comments, however, it should be fairly straightforward to see that none 
of these answers are going to work (at least, none of them will satisfy common sense). If we 
return to the example of two people shaking hands, it seems evident that even if you stick 
their hands together, even if you fuse them with an unbreakable adhesive, you will never 
make them compose a single object. You will simply have two objects – two distinct persons 
– in the rather unfortunate situation of being stuck.  
Moreover, all these bonding answers fail to account for the possibility of what are known as 
scattered composite objects – that is, composite objects whose parts are not in contact with 
one another. But common sense suggests that there are in fact such scattered objects. A 
bikini, for instance, seems to be an ordinary composite object, yet it is composed two 
distinct, and spatially separated, parts. Or the USA, to give another example, seems to be a 
composite object, yet it is composed of spatially disconnected parts – the island of Hawaii is 
separated from the mainland by a considerable distance, as is Alaska. If any variety of 
bonding-style answer were correct, then it would turn out that there are not, in fact, any 
bikinis in existence, and even more worryingly, many Hawaiians and Alaskans would lose 
their country of residence! Bonding-style answers, therefore, have found very few 
supporters. 
 
 
3.2 Series-style Answers 
Van Inwagen then went on to consider the idea that there is perhaps not a single, one-size-
fits-all answer to the SCQ, but instead, that different criteria will apply to different types of 
objects, according to which they will compose or fail to compose. The thought is that the 
criteria that a bunch of cells need to satisfy in order to compose a human being, for instance, 
might be very different from the criteria that a bunch of bricks might need to satisfy in order 
to compose a house. If this is right, then perhaps when answering the SCQ we need to set 
out the specific criteria of composition for different types of material object. Such answers 
have come to be known as series-style answers, since they will consist of a long series of 
different criteria that different types of object must satisfy in order to compose. A series-style 
answer (SSA) to the SCQ will look something like the following:  
 
(SSA): for any xs (where those xs are material objects), there is a further material object, y, 
composed of those xs if and only if the xs are F1s and stand in relation R1, or the xs are F2s 
and stand in relation R2, or …, the xs are Fns and stand in relation Rn.  
 
The attraction of this kind of answer is that it looks like it might accommodate certain 
intuitions we have about composition, such as the fact that by fastening bricks together with 
cement you can compose a further object (e.g. a house), but by fastening human beings 
together with cement you cannot.  
Van Inwagen was fairly quick to dismiss the prospects of a satisfactory series-style answer 
to the SCQ, however, as he thought that they suffered from a number of difficulties. One of 
the main problems he foresaw was that a series-style answer to the SCQ would violate the 
transitivity of parthood, which he took to be an unacceptable consequence. It is clear to see 
why one might well assume that parthood is a transitive relation. For if x is a part of y, and y 
is a part of z, then it just seems evident that x must also be a part of y. For example, if the 
bearing is part of the wheel, and the wheel is part of the car, then the bearing must also be 
part of the car.  
Van Inwagen claimed, however, that series-style answers to the SCQ would violate this 
transitivity. For instance, suppose we endorsed a series-style answer that included the fact 
that xs composed ys if and only if they were related by R1, and ys composed zs if and only if 
they were related by R2. In that case, an x could be a part of a y which was itself part of a z, 
yet x would not be part of z (because, as per the answer, xs cannot compose zs; zs can only be 
composed by ys related by R2).  
Since the publication of Material Beings, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the 
possibility of series-style answers. However, some recent work on the topic suggests that 
van Inwagen’s dismissal of such answers may have been a little hasty. Silva, 2013, has 
responded to van Inwagen’s objections and shown that series-style answers need not be 
inconsistent with the transitivity of parthood. Carmichael, 2015, has gone one step further 
and formulated a clearly-defined series-style answer to the SCQ – one which he claims 
satisfies our common sense intuitions about composition and which overcomes van 
Inwagen’s objections.  
 
3.3 Sorites Paradoxes and Sharp Cut-Off Points 
A significant problem that affects all restrictivist positions (or, at least, virtually all of them – 
see the following section, 3.4, for one exception to this) is that they are susceptible to sorites-
style arguments. This style of argument takes its name from the ancient sorites paradox, or 
the paradox of the heap (Soros, from where the term ‘sorites’ derives, is Greek for ‘heap’). 
The paradox, which is usually accredited to the Greek philosopher, Eubulides, is simple to 
set up. First, consider a single grain of rice. It seems quite clear that a single grain of rice is 
not a heap of rice; and neither is two grains, nor three. But if we had ten thousand grains, we 
would most certainly have a heap. The paradox arises because it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to state the precise point at which the heap emerges. The crucial thought that 
drives the paradox is that a single grain of rice, it is supposed, is simply not significant 
enough to make the difference between a heap and a non-heap. Adding or removing just 
one grain of rice could never create or destroy a heap. But if this is right, it seems to follow 
that if you start off without a heap, then by adding grains one at a time, you will never be 
able to make a heap, no matter how many grains you add. Conversely, if you start off with a 
heap, then by removing grains one at a time, you will never get rid of the heap, even if you 
were to remove all the grains! Thus the paradox ensues. 
The force of the sorites paradox strikes right at the heart of compositional restrictivism. To 
see why, just consider any ordinary composite object; let’s say a chair. That chair will be 
composed of many billions of atoms, each one of which will be very small indeed. Now 
when you consider just how small a single atom actually is, it seems quite clear that the 
difference of a single atom could not possibly make the difference of there being a chair or 
there not being a chair. To suppose otherwise seems, frankly, preposterous. But, now 
suppose that, with some ultra-high-precision tweezers, you began the long and laborious 
task of removing atoms from the chair, one by one. Eventually, you would reach a stage at 
which you had removed all the atoms except one; at which point you would clearly no 
longer have a chair in front of you. (A single atom doth not a chair make). What seems to 
follow from all this is that there must be a cut-off point at some stage of the atom-removal 
process at which the removal of a particular atom makes the composite object – the chair – 
suddenly cease to exist. To many, however, this is a simply fantastical proposal! To suppose 
that a single, nugatory atom could make the difference between a chair’s existing and not 
existing is a very hard conclusion to swallow.  
These sorts of considerations, concerning sorites-style arguments and sharp cut-off points 
have led many to believe that restricted composition, in any of its possible guises, is 
untenable. Peter Unger (1979; 1980) is perhaps the most notable advocate of using sorites-
style arguments against the existence of ordinary objects. 
It remains to be said, however, that whilst these sorites-style arguments certainly have force, 
they are not without opposition. Both Korman (2015) and Carmichael (2011), for instance, 
have articulated responses to the arguments and maintain a resolute conviction that 
composition is restricted.   
 
3.4 Brutal Composition  
Ned Markosian is one of the few philosophers who has persevered with restrictivism. In a 
1998 paper, he outlines and argues for a novel view which he calls ‘Brutal Composition’. 
According to this view, “there is no true, non-trivial, and finitely long answer to the SCQ” 
(Markosian, 1998, 213).  
Instead, Markosian claims that whenever composition does or doesn’t occur is simply a brute 
fact. That is to say, it is a fact, but it does not obtain in virtue of any other facts, and there can 
be no illuminating explanation of why it obtains. It’s a fact, and that’s just the way it is.  
On this view, then, the iron girders in Paris do compose the Eiffel Tower, and the limestone 
blocks in Giza do compose the pyramid. Likewise, it is also true that the Eiffel Tower and the 
Pyramid, taken together, do not compose any further object. These are just some of the facts 
about composition that obtain in the world. According to Markosian, however, there is no 
principled explanation of why these facts obtain. They just do.  
An advantage of Markosian’s view, he claims, is that it is capable of accommodating all of 
our common sense intuitions about composition (although this could be resisted – see 
below). Ordinary composite objects really do exist, and exotic, gerrymandered composite 
objects (like the object composed of the Eiffel Tower and the Great Pyramid) do not. 
Likewise, brutal composition has a clear answer to the sorites-style arguments that we 
encountered above. There are sharp cut-off points between cases of composition and non-
composition; a single atom really can make the difference between a chair’s existing and not 
existing. We don’t know exactly where the cut-off points will lie, of course, but they will be 
there somewhere. And there is no pressure on the brute compositionalist to explain why a 
cut-off point lies where it does, precisely because compositional facts are brute; they admit 
of no further explanation. As Markosian notes, the brute compositionalist “can just shrug 
and say, ‘there is no reason. It is a brute fact’” (Markosian, 1998, 37).  
However, there are a number of reasons one might be suspicious about brutal composition. 
The main reason is that Markosian’s only real motivation for endorsing the view is that it is 
meant to be the only theory capable of preserving our common sense intuitions about 
composition. The problem is, however, it is not at all clear that it actually does this.  
For instance, as James Van Cleve has pointed out, common sense may well point to the fact 
the composition is restricted, but it also surely points to the fact that there is a reason why it 
is restricted. (Van Cleve, 2008, 333). Yes, common sense suggests that the Eiffel Tower exists, 
and that it is composed of iron girders, but it also suggests that there is a reason it exists, 
namely, that it was purposely built, and that the parts are fixed together in an appropriate 
way, and so on and so forth. It is not by sheer arbitrary chance that these items compose a 
tower, or so common sense would have it.  
According to brutal composition, there is no reason why some objects compose; that’s what 
it means to say that compositional facts are brute. It therefore follows that the arrangement 
of the iron girders, and the way they are fixed together, has nothing to do with the fact that 
they compose the Eiffel Tower. We could dismantle the tower completely, we could fire the 
girders into the furthest depths of the universe, but according to brutal composition, they 
would still compose an object. But this could hardly be said to be consistent with our 
intuitions about composition!  
It is for reasons such as this, as well as the more general concern that it seems just too ad hoc, 
that Brutal Composition has not proved at all popular amongst those philosophers who 
have worked on this topic.  
 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
Because of the problems raised above, the majority of writers on this topic have concluded 
that compositional restrictivism, in any of its guises, is an untenable position. There are 
exceptions to this, of course, with van Inwagen, Markosian, and Korman, being notable 
among them, but these exceptions are undoubtedly in the minority. Our initial intuitions 
may well point to the fact that composition is restricted, but close philosophical analysis 
reveals that a principled theory that can accommodate such intuitions seems very difficult, if 
not impossible, to come by.  
But if this majority are correct, and material composition is not restricted, then it means that 
we are left only with what van Inwagen called the “extreme answers” to the SCQ (van 
Inwagen, 1990, 72). That is, one must say that composition always occurs (i.e. endorse 
compositional universalism) or say that composition never occurs (i.e. endorse compositional 
nihilism). Of these two options, it is the former that has proved the most popular among 
contemporary philosophers; indeed, it would probably be fair to say that universalism is the 
default view. (Although this may be beginning to change: in very recent years, nihilism has 
begun to grow in popularity).  
One of the main advantages that both universalism and nihilism wield over restrictivism, 
and one of the main reasons they are the most popular answers to the SCQ, is that they are 
completely unaffected by the sorites-style arguments articulated above, in section 3.3. For 
neither answer has to state where the cut-off points will lie between cases of composition 
and cases of non-composition, because neither answer admits that there are such points. 
According to universalism there are no cases of non-composition, and according to nihilism 
there are no cases of composition, thus neither theory admits the existence of cut-off points.  
The following two sections will give an overview of both universalism and nihilism, and the 
main arguments that have been given for and against them.  
 
 
4. Compositional Universalism 
Compositional Universalism (CU) can be defined as follows:  
 
(CU): for any xs whatsoever (where those xs are material objects) there is a further material 
object, y, which those xs compose.  
 
For the reader unfamiliar with this debate, it may come as something of a surprise to learn 
that the view of the informed majority is that compositional universalism is true. The reason 
for this is that the truth of universalism implies the existence of a vast number of weird and 
wonderful composite objects. After all, if universalism is true, then for any collection of 
material objects whatsoever, there will be a further object that they compose. Thus there will 
be a material object composed of your favourite shirt, Donald Trump’s hair, and the top half 
of the planet Mars. And it would turn out that there is, after all, an object composed of the 
Eiffel Tower and the Great Pyramid of Giza. Universalism is entirely indiscriminate. It 
matters not how disparate or incontiguous two objects may be; according to universalism, 
they will compose something. Despite this rather unusual fact, however, universalism 
remains a popular view.  
 
4.1 Arguments for Universalism 
4.1.1 The Argument from Elimination 
There is an argument for universalism which seems to hold considerable sway with a 
number of philosophers, even though it is rarely explicitly stated. It is an argument from 
elimination, and consists of two claims. The first claim is that composition is not restricted 
(based on the type of consideration covered in the previous section), and second claim is that 
composition clearly occurs in some cases (e.g. I exist, and I am composed of parts). The 
conjunction of these claims is taken to entail the truth of universalism:  
1. Composition is not restricted.  
2. Therefore, composition must either always occur or never occur. 
3. Composition definitely occurs in some cases. 
4. Therefore, composition must always occur.  
5. Therefore, compositional universalism is true.  
David Lewis has endorsed precisely this type of argument. He says: “no restrictions on 
composition can serve the intuitions that motivate it. So restriction would be gratuitous. 
Composition is unrestricted” (Lewis, 1986, 213). Ted Sider has also advanced an argument 
similar to this (see Sider, 2001, 120-132. It is interesting to note, however, that Sider has now 
changed his view and endorses compositional nihilism).  
The argument appears clearly valid, but in premise 3, it includes a significant assumption. 
Many, like Lewis, think that premise 3 is obviously true. Indeed, you will note in the above 
quote from Lewis that he doesn’t even state anything like premise 3. He jumps straight from 
the claim that composition is not restricted, to the conclusion that it must be unrestricted. The 
truth of premise 3 must have been so obvious to Lewis as to be not worth mentioning.  
However, for many philosophers, premise 3 is not obviously true, and cannot simply be 
assumed. One reason to think this is that once we reject compositional restrictivism, then we 
seem to reject most (if not all) of our common sense intuitions about composition along with 
it. As such, it looks questionable to make any assumptions about whether composition does 
or doesn’t occur in any given case. If these assumptions are given up, then the above 
argument loses its force, and collapses into a mere restatement of the fact that composition is 
not restricted.  
 
4.1.2 The Argument from CAI 
It has been suggested that composite objects are identical to their parts taken together. That is 
to say, if a composite object, o, is composed of some parts, the xs, then o is not an additional 
object to the xs; it just is the xs, taken collectively. This thesis has come to be known as 
Composition as Identity (CAI), and has its most notable proponent in Donald Baxter, who has 
provided some compelling examples in its support. For instance:  
Someone with a six-pack of orange juice may reflect on how many items he 
has when entering a ‘six items or less’ line in a grocery store. He may think he 
has one item, or six, but he would be astonished if the cashier said ‘Go to the 
next line please, you have seven items’. We do not ordinarily think of a six-
pack as seven items, six parts plus one whole. (Baxter, 1988, 579) 
 
The thought is, therefore, that composite objects are identical, in the strict sense of numerical 
identity, to the parts that compose them. The six-pack literally is the six bottles taken 
together – nothing more, and nothing less. (See Wallace 2011 for a nice introduction to the 
topic of composition as identity, and Baxter & Cotnoir (eds.) 2014 for more in-depth 
discussion). 
Moreover, it has also been suggested, by Trenton Merricks, that CAI entails universalism. 
That is, if CAI is true, then universalism must also be true. CAI, therefore, offers another 
potential line of argument in favour of universalism (albeit, a line of argument that is 
dependent on the truth of CAI).  
The thrust of the argument is that if composition is identity, then the fusion of any objects 
just is those objects taken together. So for any objects whatsoever, you automatically get 
their fusion, because their fusion just is those objects. Trenton Merricks forwards just such a 
proposal, making the seemingly plausible claim that “it seems nonsensical to deny the 
existence of something that would, if it existed, be (identical with) things whose existence 
one already affirms” (Merricks, 2005, 629. It should be noted that Merricks does not endorse 
universalism, however. Whilst he does claim that CAI entails universalism, he does not 
believe that CAI is true).  But that is precisely what someone would be doing if they 
endorsed CAI but did not endorse universalism, or so the argument goes. Therefore, we are 
led to conclude that if CAI is true, universalism must be true also. To illustrate, consider 
once more our six-pack of orange juice. First, suppose that you accept, unremittingly, the 
existence of the six individual bottles of juice. Now according to CAI, the six-pack (the 
whole) just is the six bottles taken together, nothing more, and nothing less. So given the fact 
that you accept the existence of the six bottles, you already accept the existence of the six-
pack. And the same goes for any collection of objects you can think of. It’s as simple as that: 
CAI entails universalism. 
There are two potential problems with the argument from CAI. First, as Ross 
Cameron has argued, there are reasons to think that the argument is not valid. Cameron’s 
central point is that CAI is a thesis about the nature of composition (i.e. it tells us what 
composition is - identity), but it doesn’t tell us when composition does and does not occur. For 
CAI tells us that when there is a composite object, that object is identical to its parts taken 
together. Furthermore, it tells us that when some objects are, taken together, identical to 
some single object, then they compose that object. Crucially, however, it doesn’t tell us when 
some objects are identical to a single object and when they are not. As Cameron says: “[CAI] 
does not tell us whether, given some xs, they in fact compose; it only settles the 
biconditional: they compose iff there is some one to which they are identical” (Cameron, 
2012, 534). In order for CAI to entail universalism, one must already assume that given any 
xs whatsoever, there is a single object to which those xs are identical – in other words, that 
there is a single object which those xs compose. But that is just to beg the question in favour 
of universalism.  
The second problem with the argument is that CAI itself is a highly controversial thesis. 
Indeed, for many, CAI is not just controversial, but incoherent. The main problem with it is 
that it seems to twist and contort the standard understanding of the relation of identity to 
unacceptable extremes. For instance, it appears that CAI violates Leibniz’s Law, which states 
that if x = y, then anything true of x must also be true of y, and vice-versa. If CAI is true, then 
it seems that this principle no longer holds. To see why, consider again our six-pack of juice. 
CAI says the six-pack is identical to the six bottles of juice. But the six-pack is a single object, 
whereas the six bottles are six objects. Therefore, it looks like something is true of the six 
bottles (i.e. they are six) which is not true of the six-pack (i.e. it is one), which is a violation of 
Leibniz’s Law.  
 
 
4.2 Arguments against Universalism 
4.2.1 The Gratuitousness of Universalism 
An often-noted drawback of universalism is that it posits the existence of too many objects. 
The ontology of the universalist is vast. The reason for this is that universalism states that for 
any collection of objects whatsoever, there will always be an object which those objects 
compose. It should be quite clear to see, therefore, that universalism implies the existence of 
a simply astronomical number of objects. For some, this objection is enough to reject 
universalism out of hand. Markosian, for instance, claims, “there is what seems to me to be a 
fatal objection to universalism: universalism entails that there are far more composite objects 
than common sense intuitions allow. […] On the basis of this objection, I reject universalism” 
(Markosian, 1998, 22-3). 
There are two main strategies universalists employ to overcome this objection. The first, 
endorsed by the likes of David Lewis and David Armstrong, is to say that whilst 
universalism does posit a vast number of composite objects, this should not count against 
the theory because these composite objects are taken to be ontologically innocent.  
The idea here is that composite objects do not contain any extra matter, over and above their 
constituent parts, and therefore they somehow come for free, ontologically speaking. 
Armstrong, for instance, tells us that “mereological wholes are not ontologically additional 
to their parts” (Armstrong, 1997, 12), whilst Achille Varzi states, “the whole and the parts 
encompass the same amount of reality and should not, therefore, be listed separately in an 
inventory of the world” (Varzi, 2000, 285). David Lewis, too, echoes these sentiments by 
saying “it would be double counting to list the cats and then list their fusion” (Lewis, 1991, 
81).  
The main problem with this strategy is that the notion of ontological innocence is somewhat 
mysterious; that is, it is not obviously clear what it is meant to consist in. If a table, for 
instance, is taken to be ontologically innocent, yet one of the atoms that composes it is not, 
then are these two entities supposed to exist in the very same sense? If so, then it is not clear 
why only one of them should ‘count’, ontologically speaking. But if not, then one might 
think that we need a clearer explanation of what this existential difference actually consists 
in. This suggests that the notion of ontological innocence is perhaps not informative to the 
degree really required.  
It is perhaps worth mentioning, however, that this objection to ontological innocence loses 
its force if the proponent of ontological innocence also endorses composition as identity. 
After all, if you already accept the existence of some parts, then accepting their fusion does 
not seem like an extra ontological commitment if it is identical to those very parts. Without 
the addition of CAI, however, the problem persists.  
The second strategy that has been proposed by universalists, in response to the charge of 
ontological gratuity, is to simply bite the bullet. That is, admit that universalism is not very 
parsimonious with respect to the number of composite objects it posits, but then deny that 
parsimony in that respect is particularly important. This line has been taken by Lewis, who 
makes a distinction between quantitative and qualitative parsimony. Qualitative parsimony is 
concerned only with the number of types of entity that a theory posits, whereas quantitative 
parsimony concerns the number of tokens of those types. Lewis has argued that only 
qualitative parsimony is an important theoretical virtue; once you have admitted a particular 
type of entity into your ontology (e.g. composite objects) then it does not matter how many 
tokens of that type your ontology contains. Given that most of us already accept the existence 
of the type – material composite object – then it doesn’t matter that universalism posits a lot 
of them; this shouldn’t count against the theory.  
There are two potential sticking points for this response. The first is that some thinkers, such 
as Daniel Nolan (1997), have argued that quantitative parsimony is in fact a theoretical 
virtue. If these thinkers are right, then Lewis’s response looks clearly flawed. The second 
thing to note is that compositional nihilists are likely to remind the universalist that they do 
not countenance material composite objects at all. Therefore, even if we ignore quantitative 
parsimony, nihilism has the advantage of being qualitatively more parsimonious than 
universalism, since it posits one fewer type of thing.  
 
4.2.2 The Counter-Intuitiveness of Universalism 
A different objection that is sometimes levelled at universalism is that it flies in the face of 
common sense. The vast majority of the composite objects that universalism posits are just 
not the sort of object that common sense would countenance. Think of any collection of 
objects you like – no matter how random, how disparate, and how disconnected they may 
be, there will, according to universalism, be a further object they compose. As Lewis (1991, 
7-8) reminds us, universalism admits the existence of trout-turkeys: entities composed of the 
undetached front half of a trout, and the undetached rear half of a turkey. Some may think, 
therefore, that these sorts of objects simply make universalism too counter-intuitive to be 
true.  
Lewis, however, has a solution ready at hand. He claims that in ordinary thought and talk 
we restrict the domain of our quantifiers such that they range only over the ordinary objects 
of common sense, and not over extraordinary, gerrymandered objects such as trout-turkeys. 
It is only because of this that universalism seems so counter-intuitive.  
In Lewis’s defence, we do often use quantifiers in a restricted sense in ordinary 
communication. For instance, if a mugger stole your wallet, you may tell the police that he 
stole all your money. But you would not literally mean all your money. (Presumably, the 
mugger did not empty your bank account and gather all the loose change from the back of 
your sofa). What you would have meant, of course, is that the mugger stole all the money 
you had with you at the time. Thus you would have been tacitly restricting the domain of 
your quantifiers such that they ranged only over the contents of your wallet, or perhaps over 
whatever you had on your person. Once this is recognised, it becomes clear that we actually 
employ restricted quantification all the time (note: that does not actually mean all the time).  
Lewis suggests this is what happens when we talk about composite objects. We tacitly 
restrict our domain of quantification such that it includes only those composite objects 
recognised by common sense, and does not include exotic composites like trout-turkeys: 
Restrict quantifiers not composition. [...] We have no name for the mereological 
sum of the right half of my left shoe plus the moon plus the sum of all her 
Majesty’s ear-rings, except for the long and clumsy name I just gave it; we have 
no predicates under which such entities fall, except for technical terms like 
‘physical object’ (in a special sense known to philosophers) or blanket terms like 
‘entity’ and maybe ‘thing’; we seldom admit it to our domains of restricted 
quantification. It is very sensible to ignore such a thing in our ordinary thought 
and language. But ignoring it won’t make it go away. (Lewis, 1986, 213). 
 
 
The restricted quantification strategy is quite popular among universalists, but it is not 
without its problems. A central problem with it is that it looks prima facie implausible (see 
Korman, 2007). Returning to our example of the mugger, imagine that a particularly 
meticulous police officer responded to your claim with an arched eyebrow and asked, “you 
really mean he stole all your money; every last penny you owned?”. You may well be 
exasperated by such a response, but you would probably understand what the officer 
meant. You would simply have to re-iterate more precisely that you meant the mugger stole 
all the money that was in your wallet.  
But now suppose, on telling the officer that there were precisely two items in the wallet – 
two twenty-pound notes, say – he were to respond, “only two items, you say? But what 
about the object that those two notes compose? And what about the object composed of the 
left half of one note and the right half of the other?”. Such a question would not exasperate, 
but completely befuddle! It seems highly implausible that one might casually respond, “Oh, 
sorry, I didn’t realise you were counting those types of object too”.  
What these observations suggest is that whilst we certainly do restrict our quantifiers in 
certain circumstances, it usually only takes minimal reflection (or perhaps for someone - like 
a fussy police officer - to point it out to us) for us to realise, and to accept, that we are doing 
so. But there is no controversy there – it is just something that we do. In contrast, it appears 
much more controversial to suggest that we regularly restrict our quantifiers to exclude 
exotic composite objects. For if you tried to point out to someone that they were doing that, it 
is unlikely that they would even understand what you were talking about, let alone accept 
that what you said was true. Moreover, once you had explained what you meant, it is still 
plausibly unlikely that they would accept what you have said. Much more likely is that they 
would simply insist that the exotic composites you were attempting to refer to didn’t exist. 
Seen in this light, some, like Korman, claim that it stretches the limits of credibility to 
suggest that, in ordinary thought and talk, we restrict our quantifiers so as to exclude exotic 
composites. 
 
 
 
4.2.3 The Argument from Primitive Cardinality 
Juan Comesaña (2008) has presented an argument against universalism based on the 
grounds that it places unacceptable restrictions on the number of material objects that a 
world could contain. More technically, it conflicts with a principle that he calls primitive 
cardinality (PC).  
(PC): For any n there could have been exactly n material things.  
PC simply states that there is a possible world containing just one material thing, a possible 
world containing just two material things, a possible world containing just three material 
things, and so on and so forth, for every positive integer. Comesaña makes the plausible 
claim that PC seems obviously true. After all, why could there not be a possible world with 
just seven material objects in it, for instance, or any other whole number? There seems no 
good reason to think that this couldn’t be the case.  
However, according to universalism, PC is false. For instance, it is impossible, if 
universalism is true, to have a world in which there are just two material objects. For 
according to universalism, if you have two objects, you always get a further object that they 
compose. Thus it is impossible to have a two-object world, because there will automatically 
be a third object at such a world: the mereological fusion of those two objects.  
Furthermore, universalism does not only rule out the possibility of two-thing worlds, but it 
also rules out the possibility of four-thing worlds, five-thing worlds, six-thing worlds, eight-
thing worlds, and countless more. The reason for this is that with the addition of each 
individual simple, there will also be the automatic addition of numerous fusions composed 
of the previously existing simples and the newly added simple. More precisely, for any 
world with a particular number of simples, n, the total number of material things (i.e. 
simples and fusions) at that world will be 2n-1. Therefore, universalism is incompatible with 
PC. 
How seriously one takes this argument will depend on the strength of one’s conviction in 
the truth of PC. Comesaña claims that intuition supports the truth of PC. He claims that we 
have “particular pre-theoretical judgments that there could have been exactly two things, 
and exactly three things, and...”, whereas universalism is supported only by abstract and 
theoretical principles. Moreover, he claims that it is “standard methodological procedure” in 
many areas of philosophy to give precedence to pre-theoretical judgments over general 
theoretical principles, when they conflict. Because of this, he claims that this constitutes 
prima facie evidence in favour of PC (Comesaña, 2008).  
The argument from primitive cardinality is unlikely to be considered as fatal to 
universalism. After all, the universalist can just bite the bullet and admit that it is simply a 
consequence of the theory that PC is rendered false. This may well violate an intuition we 
have, but it is not clear how strong an intuition that is in the first place. Moreover, if 
compositional restrictivism is false, we have already had to concede that many of our 
intuitions about material objects are false, so one further concession may not be that hard to 
take.  
Finally, the universalist can remind us that although her theory renders PC, as stated above, 
as false, it is perfectly compatible with a similar principle, that one could call the primitive 
cardinality of simples (PCS).  
(PCS): For any n, there could have been exactly n simples.  
Universalism is perfectly compatible with PCS and, indeed, it may well be PCS, not PC, that 
our pre-theoretical judgements are driving at. 
 
4.2.4 The Identity Argument 
One final argument against universalism suggests that the universalist owes us some 
answers to some particularly tricky questions concerning the identity of composite objects. 
The argument was originally proposed by van Inwagen (1990, 75), but the version presented 
below is a modified, somewhat more neutral, version than his.  
The argument rests on the fact that according to universalism, any collection of objects 
composes a further object, regardless of any facts concerning those objects’ nature, their 
locations, or the spatial or causal relations that hold between them. Indeed, according to 
universalism, it is enough that two objects merely exist, that they compose a further object. 
No other conditions need be satisfied.  
Given this fact, the argument can be set up as follows. Consider an ordinary composite 
object, let’s say, a tree, and let’s call this tree, ‘Spruce’. According to universalism, Spruce is a 
composite object and is composed of a large number of simples (sub-atomic particles, or 
what-have-you) that are arranged in a tree-like fashion. If we call the fusion of those simples, 
‘F’, we can say that Spruce = F.  
Now suppose that a bolt of lightening were to strike Spruce and vaporise it. The force of the 
bolt was such that Spruce was completely destroyed, and all her constituent simple parts 
were scattered far and wide throughout the surrounding area.  
In this eventuality, it would seem quite clear that Spruce no longer exists. If you were to look 
at the exact spot of the incident, there would be no tree present. However, F does still exist. 
The simples that composed Spruce have not been destroyed but merely rearranged; 
scattered far and wide. But according to universalism, their spatial location does not affect 
their compositional status – they still compose the very same fusion they composed before. 
Thus we now have a situation in which F exists, but Spruce does not. But this contradicts our 
earlier claim that Spruce = F. For if x = y, it is impossible for x to exist whilst y does not.  
The upshot of this argument is that whilst universalism does posit lots of mereological 
fusions (like F), these fusions are clearly not the ordinary objects of common sense (like 
Spruce). This is because these fusions are virtually indestructible – you can scatter their parts 
to the furthest corners of the known universe, and they will still exist. But the same cannot 
be said of trees, like Spruce, or indeed any ordinary objects of common sense. In light of all 
this, it looks like the universalist needs to answer two particularly difficult questions:  
1. What are ordinary objects, if not mereological fusions of simples?  
2. Why should we accept the existence of all these peculiar mereological fusions, if they 
do not include, after all, the ordinary objects of common sense we thought they did?  
There are a couple of ways in which the universalist could respond to this argument. The 
first is to endorse a relation of constitution, and the second is to endorse four-dimensionalism.  
On the first option, the universalist would deny the premise in the argument that states 
Spruce = F. Instead, ordinary objects are not taken to be identical to mereological fusions, but 
constituted by mereological fusions. (Recall the discussion of material constitution in section 
1.2). According to this view, one can say that F constitutes Spruce whilst its parts are 
arranged in a tree-like fashion, but when the parts are spread far and wide, after the 
lightening bolt, F no longer constitutes Spruce.  
Whilst this view certainly overcomes the argument, it leaves many questions unanswered. 
First and foremost, what is this relation of constitution meant to be? Moreover, if it is the 
case that F constitutes Spruce at some points of its existence but not others, it implies that 
constitution is restricted (in the same sense that composition was taken to be restricted in 
section 3). But this seems to leave the view open to the sorites-style arguments we 
encountered earlier, i.e. where will the cut-off points lie between cases of constitution and 
cases of non-constitution?  It also seems to invite a question similar to the SCQ, that we 
could call the Special Constitution Question; that is, under what conditions does some object, 
o, constitute an F? This question may well prove to be just as difficult to answer as the 
original SCQ.  
The second option for the universalist would be to endorse four-dimensionalism: the view 
which states that material objects are extended through time, in much the same way they are 
extended through space. Hence material objects are four-dimensional (extended in the three 
dimensions of space, and the fourth dimension of time). As such, material objects not only 
have spatial parts, but also temporal parts.  
A consequence of this view is that objects are not wholly present at any particular moment of 
time. Rather, they merely have a temporal part that is wholly present. To illustrate, consider 
an analogy. The river Thames is not wholly present at London Bridge. Rather, only a part of 
the river exists there. The entire river stretches all the way from the Cotswolds to the North 
Sea. In the same way, four-dimensionalists would say that the river Thames is not wholly 
present at any given time. Rather, only a (temporal) part of it is. The whole river stretches 
(temporally) all the way from that moment of time at which it came in to existence, to that 
moment of time at which it will cease to be. 
Interestingly, just like the constitution theorist, the four-dimensionalist will deny the 
premise which claims Spruce = F, but for very different reasons. Instead, Spruce and F are 
taken to be distinct, four-dimensional objects that merely share some temporal parts (in the 
way that two distinct streets could share some spatial parts, at the region at which they cross 
one another). Specifically, they share the temporal part at which all the parts of F are 
arranged in a tree-like manner. So according to this view, there are not two distinct objects 
located in the same place at the same time. Rather, at t, there is a single object present, which 
is a (temporal) part of two distinct objects, Spruce and F. 
Each of these two responses does enough to overcome the identity argument, but they both 
represent a cost to the universalist. Thus whilst it is not insurmountable, the identity 
argument seems to show that accepting universalism (which is already a controversial 
metaphysical thesis) forces one into accepting at least one other controversial metaphysical 
thesis: either the constitution view or four-dimensionalism. This is unlikely to be considered a 
fatal cost, but it is a cost that must be recognised nonetheless.  
 5. Compositional Nihilism 
The remaining answer to the SCQ is compositional nihilism (CN):  
(CN): for any xs (where those xs are material objects), there is never a further material object 
which those xs compose.  
More simply put, according to nihilism, there are no material composite objects at all; all 
material objects in existence are mereologically simple.  
Nihilism, on the face of it at least, is even more radical than universalism. Think of any 
object at all that you consider to be composite, that is, to have parts. According to the 
nihilist, it does not exist. For the nihilist, there are no tables, there are no buildings, there are 
no planets or stars. There are not even any human beings. (That is, so long as you take such 
entities to be composite). For this reason, nihilism is often dismissed as obviously false. Any 
theory which entails the view that there are no human beings is obviously false, or so one 
might well be tempted to think. However, nihilism has recently been growing in popularity 
and has been defended in print by a number of philosophers (for instance, Cameron, 2010; 
Sider, 2013; Cornell, 2017). These philosophers tend to claim that these supposedly absurd 
consequences of the view (for example, that there are no human beings) are not, in fact, as 
absurd as they may seem. Once the view is properly understood, they maintain, these 
apparent absurdities can easily be explained away.  
 
5.1 Arguments for Nihilism 
5.1.1 The Causal Overdetermination Argument 
One type of argument that has proved to be quite influential in the debate over material 
composition is that which suggests we should reject the existence of composite objects 
because, if there were any such things, they would be causally redundant.  
Causal redundancy arguments of this ilk are probably more familiar within the philosophy 
of mind, as they have often been employed in support of physicalism. The idea is that we 
can give a full causal explanation of human action in terms of the physical states and 
processes that occur in the brain. As such, there is no need to posit any non-physical, mental 
entities, as such things would have no causal role to play; they would be causally redundant. 
(See Kim, 1993). A similar type of argument can be formulated in support of nihilism. That 
is, we can give a full causal explanation of any physical event solely by appealing to the 
microphysical particles involved, their properties, and the relations in which they stand. 
Thus there is no need to posit any macroscopic, composite objects, because such things 
would have no causal role to play; they would be causally redundant.  
Trenton Merricks has provided the clearest, and most forceful, version of this argument 
(Merricks, 2001). (Although it should be made clear that Merricks only uses the argument to 
support a quasi-nihilistic view rather than a full-blown compositional nihilism. He does, for 
instance, allow that human beings exist and are material composite objects. However, he 
rejects the existence of all inanimate composite objects). Central to Merricks’ argument is the 
notion of causal overdetermination. Causal overdetermination occurs when there are multiple, 
individually sufficient, causes for an event. That is, when an event has more than one cause, 
each of which would have been fully sufficient, on its own, to bring that event about. It is 
widely agreed that causal overdetermination is objectionable, and that we should avoid 
endorsing any theories which involve it (see, for instance, Bunzl, 1979; Loeb 1974; Kim, 
1993). Merricks seizes on this claim and uses it to argue against inanimate material 
composite objects. 
To see how the argument works, consider Merricks’ example of a baseball smashing a 
window. The thought is that the activity of the atoms which are taken to compose the 
baseball is quite enough on its own to give a complete causal explanation of the shattering of 
the window. Therefore, if there exists a baseball in addition to the atoms, then that baseball 
cannot play any causal role in the shattering of the window – if it did, the shattering of the 
window would be causally overdetermined. Thus we must therefore conclude that baseballs 
(and, by extension, all other material composite objects), if they were to exist, would have no 
causal powers at all.  
Merricks completes the argument by making the seemingly plausible claim that material 
composite objects, like baseballs, surely would have causal powers if they existed. A baseball, 
if it existed, would be a physical object, with physical properties such as mass and so on and 
so forth. Thus it would be implausible to suggest that such a thing would be causally inert; 
indeed, such a suggestion may well contravene basic laws of physics. As such, he argues, we 
have no option but to conclude that material composite objects, like baseballs, do not in fact 
exist. 
There are ways in which the argument can be resisted. The most straightforward way of 
doing so is to simply allow that physical events (like the shattering of windows by baseballs) 
are in fact causally overdetermined, i.e. that they are caused by composite objects and by the 
constituent parts of those objects. Allowing this would certainly undermine Merricks’ 
argument, but at the same time, it would also entail that there is widespread and systematic 
causal overdetermination in the world. For most, however, this conclusion is simply too 
unpalatable to accept.  
A more sophisticated response has been offered by Amie Thomasson, who suggests that the 
argument is flawed because it is based on the incorrect assumption that composite objects 
are separate and independent entities from the simple parts of which they are composed 
(Thomasson, 2006). Thomasson accepts that causal overdetermination is highly 
objectionable, but only in those cases in which the two overdetermining causes are 
completely separate and independent from one another. (To take a well-used example, 
consider a person executed by firing squad, who is hit by two bullets at exactly the same 
time, each one of which was fully sufficient to kill them). Thomasson claims, however, that 
composite objects are clearly not separate and independent from their constituent parts, thus 
the worry about causal overdetermination is misplaced.  
Thomasson certainly has a point that there is a particularly intimate connection between a 
composite object and its parts. They are not separate and independent in the same way that 
the two bullets in the firing squad example are. It would be impossible to throw the baseball, 
for instance, without also throwing its constituent parts. However, providing that one does 
not endorse composition as identity, the baseball must be considered a distinct object from the 
parts that make it up. As a result, it is not obvious as to just how concerned we should be 
about the claim that both the baseball and its constituent parts have causal powers.  
 
5.1.2 The Problem-Solving Argument 
Another point in favour of compositional nihilism is that it provides a straightforward 
solution to a number of long-standing problems generated by ordinary material objects. For 
instance, in section 1.2, we considered the problem that arises when one considers a statue 
and the lump of bronze (or clay, or whatever) that it is made of. The puzzle emerges because 
it looks like we need to say that the statue and the lump of bronze are distinct objects, as they 
have different properties (e.g. the lump existed before the statue did, and it would survive 
being squashed into a ball, whereas the statue would not). But this leads to the seemingly 
bizarre conclusion that we have two distinct objects (a statue and a lump of bronze) 
occupying exactly the same space at exactly the same time. Other recalcitrant problems 
which are similar include the Ship of Theseus, the case of Tibbles the cat (see Wiggins, 1968), 
and the problem of the many (see Unger, 1980).   
Various potential solutions have been offered to these problems, but most of them involve 
the acceptance of some controversial metaphysical thesis or other, such as four-
dimensionalism, or the constitution view. The compositional nihilist, however, avoids all 
these problems in their entirety. This is because, according to the nihilist, there are no 
composite objects at all. There are no statues, and there are no lumps of bronze, thus the 
question of how these things relate to one another never arises. Likewise, the nihilist doesn’t 
have to worry about the problems of the Ship of Theseus or of Tibbles the cat, because there 
are no such things as ships or cats.   
Compositional nihilists often point to this fact as providing support to their view: it offers a 
simple and elegant way of dissolving (or, rather, avoiding) all the problems generated by 
material constitution. Indeed, the nihilist could well go one step further and say that the 
only reason these puzzles have arisen at all is that we have been mistakenly assuming that 
statues/lumps/ships/cats/etc. exist in the first place. The puzzles are a direct product of a 
confused and fallacious understanding of the world. Once we understand the true nature of 
the world (i.e. that there is no such thing as material composition), the puzzles never even 
get off the ground.  
The obvious counter-response to this argument, however, is that compositional nihilism is a 
far more extreme and controversial metaphysical thesis than any of those which are invoked 
to solve the problems of material constitution. On this view, therefore, the nihilist cuts off 
their nose to spite their face. Sure, nihilism might avoid these philosophically puzzling 
problems of material constitution, but it does so at the exorbitant cost of denying the 
existence of any ordinary material objects whatsoever. This, for some, is just far too high a 
cost to pay.  
 
5.1.3 The Argument from Ideological Parsimony 
Ted Sider has recently put forward an argument for compositional nihilism based on what 
he calls ‘ideological parsimony’ (Sider, 2013). The argument appeals to a distinction, 
originally made by Quine, between a theory’s ‘ontology’ (which consists of the objects the 
theory posits) and its ‘ideology’ (which consists of the primitive, or unexplained, terms or 
notions the theory employs).  
Arguments that appeal to ontological parsimony (that is, arguments which suggest one theory 
is better than another because it posits fewer objects) are fairly commonplace in philosophy. 
But Sider claims that similar arguments can be made which appeal to ideological parsimony 
(that is, arguments which claim one theory is better than another because it employs fewer 
primitive terms). Sider’s claim is that nihilism is not only ontologically more parsimonious 
than universalism (it posits fewer objects – only simples, and no composites), but it is also 
more ideologically parsimonious, because it can completely do away with the notion of 
parthood and the related mereological terms and concepts that go with it. The general idea 
is that this makes nihilism an ideologically simpler theory than universalism (or, indeed, 
than any theory that accepts the existence of any composite objects), and this should count in 
its favour.  
One way to respond to Sider’s argument would be to accept it in spirit, but to question its 
strength. That is, it is not obvious how much weight one should afford the notion of 
ideological parsimony in the first place. If one was unconvinced, then it may seem that the 
advantage offered by nihilism in this regard was marginal at best. But for those who place 
great value on ideological parsimony, by contrast, the argument might have considerable 
power. The jury, it seems, is still out on this issue (although see Cowling, 2013, for a defence 
of the virtues of ideological parsimony). A final point worth considering here is that one 
may well think that any advantage that nihilism gains in ideological parsimony is going to 
be outweighed by the various costs it incurs, such as the fact it denies the existence of 
ordinary composite objects, like tables, chairs, and human beings.  
 
5.2 Arguments against Compositional Nihilism 
5.2.1 The Common Sense Objection 
By far the most common objection to compositional nihilism in the extant literature is one 
that appeals to common sense. It is simply obvious that composite objects exist, thus it is 
simply obvious that nihilism is false, or so the argument goes. This view is shared by many 
eminent thinkers (such as Markosian, 1998, 221; Schaffer, 2009, 358), and is perhaps best 
summed up by Michael Rea, who says: “it is just obvious that there are tables, chairs, 
computers and cars. The fact that some philosophical arguments suggest otherwise seems 
simply an indication that something has gone wrong with those arguments” (Rea, 1998, 
348). 
This kind of argument shares many similarities with G. E. Moore’s famous, hand-raising, 
refutation of idealism. Essentially, the idea is that we can be far more certain of the common 
sense fact that tables, chairs, and other composite objects exist, than we can of any of the 
abstract and theoretical premises employed in arguments for nihilism. Therefore, common 
sense should win out – we should accept the existence of ordinary composite objects and 
conclude that nihilism, regardless of any theoretical advantages it may offer, is false.  
Those attracted to compositional nihilism have employed a number of different strategies to 
combat this objection. A theme that is common to many of them is that the common sense 
objection is simply misjudged. That is, it misunderstands, or misconstrues, precisely what 
nihilism actually states. The point, which has been made by a number of contemporary 
thinkers (for instance, Sider, 2013; Cornell, 2017), is that whilst nihilism does deny the 
existence of ordinary objects like tables and chairs, it does not deny the existence of the 
physical matter that allegedly composes those objects. Once this fact is recognised, nihilism 
does not, in fact, violate our common sense intuitions in the objectionable way it is often 
claimed to.  
As an example, consider an ordinary composite object: a house. According to common 
sense, this house is made up of many parts. At base, these parts will be very small indeed, 
i.e. some kind of sub-atomic particles or whatever our scientific theories tell us are the 
fundamental constituents of matter. The point is that the nihilist accepts the existence of all 
these sub-atomic particles. All she denies is that these particles compose some single, 
composite object: a house. When seen like this, the common sense objection seems to lose 
some of its bite. As Cian Dorr has observed:  
If all the plates in my kitchen dresser were to cease to exist, but all the 
molecules in my dresser were to stay arranged exactly as they are, I 
wouldn’t care very much. My guests would have no new reason to worry 
about their food getting all over the tablecloth. In fact, they would never 
know unless I told them – but come to think of it, I would never know 
either. (Dorr, 2002, 42-3) 
 
In light of all this, there appears to be a question mark over just how much of a conflict there 
really is between compositional nihilism and common sense. Taken at face value, with its 
outright denial of all composite objects, nihilism seems about as controversial a theory as 
one could wish for, but once it is recognised that nihilism still acknowledges the matter that 
is taken to compose these composite objects, then the power of the common sense objection 
seems to wane. 
 
5.2.2 The Argument from Emergence 
A further argument against compositional nihilism is based on what has been called the 
problem of emergence. In its basic form, the argument begins with the claim that nihilism is 
incompatible with the existence of emergent properties. It then goes on to say that since 
there are very good reasons to believe that there are emergent properties, there are equally 
good reasons to think that nihilism must be false. The beginnings of an argument like this 
can be found in van Inwagen, 1990 and Merricks, 2001, but perhaps its clearest articulation is 
in Schaffer, 2007.   
To appreciate the force of the argument, one first has to understand what emergent 
properties actually are. An emergent property is a property of an object or system that 
cannot be explained or accounted for solely by the properties of that objects parts. That is to 
say, emergent properties are taken to be things that are somehow over and above a mere 
combination of the properties and relations of their bearer’s base constituents. Most familiar 
properties are clearly not emergent in this sense. Take mass, for instance. Mass, like most 
properties, is reducible; one can explain the mass of an object or system reductively, in terms 
of the mass of each of its constituent parts. (For example, the mass of a 100kg pile of bricks 
can be explained or accounted for solely by the fact that each of the one-hundred bricks in 
the pile has a mass of 1kg).  
Emergent properties, by contrast, resist this kind of reduction. If a property, F, of an object or 
system is emergent, then it cannot be explained or accounted for solely by an appeal to the 
properties and relations of its constituent parts. To illustrate, consider the water in a 
swimming pool. It has the property of being wet. But none of the individual H2O molecules 
that make it up have that property (a single molecule is not wet). Thus the property of 
wetness seems to emerge at the macro-level, and can’t be reduced to a mere aggregation of 
properties and relations at the micro-level. (Note: this is just an illustration. It is far from 
clear whether wetness is, in fact, a genuinely emergent property).  
The most common arena in which emergent properties are postulated is the philosophy of 
mind and consciousness. The thought is that mental states – something like an excruciating 
pain, or a sharp pang of guilt, for example – are so entirely distinct in character from the 
electro-chemical, neurological properties that are instantiated by parts of the brain, that they 
cannot be explicable purely in terms of those properties. (Just like a single molecule of water 
is not wet, a single cell in the brain does not feel pain/guilt/love/etc). They may well be 
caused by activity in the brain, but they emerge holistically as being far greater than the sum 
of their causal beginnings.  
Another quite distinct field in which emergence plays a prominent role is quantum 
mechanics. Very roughly, the thought is that certain composite quantum objects or systems 
(often referred to as ‘entangled systems’) can exhibit properties that are quite inexplicable in 
terms of the object’s/system’s sub-atomic constituents alone (see Schaffer 2007 for more 
details of emergence in quantum physics). 
With this understanding of emergent properties in hand, it is only a short step to see why 
they cause such a problem for the nihilist. The reason is that emergent properties seem to 
imply a stratified picture of the world, whereby reality is divided up into levels of 
mereological complexity. At the base level, you have the mereological simples, and then you 
have higher levels populated by the composite objects those simples compose. Emergent 
properties are those which emerge at higher levels than the base level – that is, which are 
instantiated by composite objects – and which cannot be explained purely by appealing to 
the objects and properties at the base level. The problem for the nihilist is that they deny this 
stratification of reality: there is the base level and nothing else. As such, there are no 
candidate objects in the nihilist’s ontology that could have emergent properties. Quite 
simply, there is nowhere for emergent properties to emerge.   
If this is right, and nihilism is incompatible with emergent properties, then given that there 
are good reasons to think that emergent properties do exist (and both quantum physics and 
philosophy of mind suggest that there are such reasons), these reasons also seem to suggest 
that nihilism is false.  
There appear to be three possible ways in which the nihilist could respond to this charge. 
The first strategy would be to simply reject the possibility of emergent properties. But since 
this would conflict with popular views in both quantum physics and philosophy of mind, it 
is not a particularly attractive route to take. The second strategy would be to endorse a fairly 
radical form of compositional nihilism – known in the literature as existence monism – which 
claims that there is only a single material object in existence, the world itself, and it is 
mereologically simple (i.e. has no parts). Schaffer 2007 argues that this is the only way for 
the nihilist to overcome the problem of emergence (although it should be noted that Shaffer 
himself does not endorse existence monism). The problem with this strategy is that existence 
monism is considered by many as being even more extreme and implausible than standard 
nihilism. Shaffer himself, for instance, labels it a ‘crazy view’. However, see Horgan & Potrc, 
2008, or Cornell, 2016, for recent defences of monism.  
The final, and most promising strategy, would be to argue that nihilism is in fact compatible 
with emergent properties. This strategy has been put forward by Caves 2018 and Cornell 
2017, who both argue that simples can collectively instantiate emergent properties, even if 
none of them individually instantiate that property, and that no composite objects are 
required in order for this to be possible. Therefore, emergent properties (such as mental 
states) can still emerge at the macro level, even though there are no composite objects at that 
level to instantiate them.  
 
5.2.3 The Problem of Atomless Gunk 
According to our current scientific theories, physical matter bottoms out at a ‘base level’. For 
instance, an ordinary object, like a table, is made of molecules; those molecules are made of 
atoms, and those atoms are made of even smaller parts such as leptons and quarks. 
However, that, we are told, is as far as we can go. Leptons and quarks themselves have no 
smaller parts. They are fundamental particles; they are simple; they represent the ‘bottom 
layer’ of reality.  
But what if this view was wrong? What if the particles that we currently think to be 
fundamental are in fact made of even smaller parts? This is surely a live possibility. After all, 
before we discovered the existence of sub-atomic particles, it was presumed that atoms 
themselves were the smallest constituents of reality. (Indeed, the term ‘atom’ was used 
precisely because it is derived from the Greek for ‘indivisible’). We were wrong then, so we 
could surely also be wrong now.  
Some have suggested, however, that it is possible that there may not be a ‘base level’ at all. 
That is, matter could be infinitely divisible. Another way of saying that is that for any bit of 
physical matter you choose, all of its parts will have further parts. This rather exotic type of 
physical matter was labelled by David Lewis as “atomless gunk” (Lewis, 1991, 20), although 
it is more commonly referred to now as plain ‘gunk’.  
The possibility of gunk represents a threat to nihilism. The reason for this is that according 
to nihilism, the only material objects that exist are simples (that is, objects with no parts). But 
if matter were ‘gunky’, then it would turn out that there were no simples at all (because 
every part of gunky matter has further parts – there are no simple parts of gunk). Therefore, 
if matter were gunky, the nihilist would be committed to saying that there were, in fact, no 
material objects in existence at all.  
The most common response to this problem is to deny flat-out that gunk is a real possibility. 
It may seem as though it is possible, in the sense that we can conceive of such stuff without 
running into any obvious contradiction, but this appearance is illusory. Gunk is not possible, 
and matter must bottom out at some point, thus nihilism is preserved. See Williams, 2006, for 
a defence of this approach.  
 
6. Deflationism 
So far, it has been suggested that all answers to the special composition question must fall 
into one of three categories: restrictivism, universalism, or nihilism. However, there is in fact 
a fourth way in which one could respond to the question: to dismiss it altogether. This kind of 
response has been articulated by a number of philosophers, who have dismissed the SCQ for 
a variety of reasons. These views fall under the more general heading of ‘deflationism’, as 
they attempt to ‘deflate’ the importance of the debate over material composition.  
Some examples of such deflationist views include that of Amie Thomasson, who claims the 
SCQ to be an unanswerable question (Thomasson, 2006), and that of Jonathan Schaffer, who 
takes the existence of composite objects to be obvious and trivial (Schaffer, 2009). But the 
most influential deflationary account is that of Eli Hirsch, and is discussed below.  
 
6.1 Hirsch and Quantifier Variance 
Hirsch argues that the debate over material composition is not a genuinely ontological 
debate, but rather, merely a verbal dispute (see Hirsch, 2005). What this means is that when 
a compositional nihilist argues with a compositional universalist about whether there are 
any tables, for instance, they are merely talking past one another rather than having a genuine 
disagreement about what things exist. The source of confusion is that they are using the 
same words to mean different things. In slogan like fashion: they agree about the facts, they 
disagree about the semantics.  
More specifically, Hirsch has proposed a theory – that has its roots in the thought of Rudolf 
Carnap – of ‘quantifier variance’, whereby different speakers use quantifiers (that is, 
quantificational expressions, such as ‘exists’, and ‘there is’) with different meanings. Thus 
when a universalist says ‘tables exist’, and a nihilist responds, ‘tables do not exist’, they are 
both in fact speaking the truth, but merely taking the term, ’exist’, to mean different things. 
Central to Hirsch’s view, moreover, is that there is no correct or privileged way to use 
quantificational language. There are many different ways in which one can describe reality 
(for example, ways in which mereological fusions of the Eiffel Tower and the Great pyramid 
at Giza are said to exist, and ways in which they are not), but none of these ways are any 
more correct than any other. The upshot is that disputes like that between the nihilist and the 
universalist arise because the two parties are speaking different (albeit similar) languages. 
They are, at base, disputes about the meaning of words, not about the nature of reality.  
There is strong opposition to Hirsch’s view, however, largely because it is often supposed to 
involve a radical anti-realism about the nature of reality. In short, if there is no correct way in 
which to describe reality, then it seems to follow that reality doesn’t have an objective nature 
at all (for if it did, one could describe it rightly or wrongly). Many thinkers claim that reality 
does have an objective nature. What this means is that there is a correct way to describe the 
world, and that some descriptions are better (that is, more accurate) than others. Ted Sider, 
in his 2011 book, Writing the Book of the World, gives a comprehensive defence of this kind of 
view.  
This debate over the legitimacy, or substantiality, of the special composition question, is just 
a small part of the larger debate between ontological realists and ontological anti-realists. 
The former camp, including the likes of Sider, maintain that the ontological questions that 
metaphysicians often concern themselves with (concerning disputed entities such as 
composite objects, temporal parts, possible objects, abstract objects, universals, and so on) 
are important and substantive, and need to be answered satisfactorily. The latter camp, by 
contrast, including the likes of Hirsch, argue that these disputes are, for a variety of reasons, 
either defective, or unimportant. This debate remains unresolved, and takes centre stage in 
the currently burgeoning field of metametaphysics. (See Chalmers, Manley, and Wasserman 
(eds.), 2009).  
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